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Can Capital Income Taxes Survive? And Should They? 
 
 Peter Birch Sørensen1 
 
 
Introduction 
Can capital income taxes survive? And should they? In recent recent decades these 
questions have been debated with increasing intensity among tax economists and policy makers, as 
growing capital mobility and the ensuing tax competition has driven down statutory tax rates on 
capital income throughout the world. Those who believe that returns to savings should not be taxed 
have typically welcomed capital tax competition, hoping that it will push governments towards 
greater reliance on consumption-based taxation. However, many other observers fear that an erosion 
of capital income taxation will undermine the integrity and political legimitacy of the tax system 
and lead to greater inequality and to an underprovision of public goods – the well-known spectacle 
of a ‘race to the bottom’. 
 In this paper I discuss whether capital income taxes are actually vanishing, and 
whether and how we should attempt to tax capital income in a globalising economy. These are big 
issues, so my discussion will have to be selective. Throughout the paper I will focus on tax policy in 
the open economy, but I will not address the problem of international tax coordination. Instead, I 
will ask how the national government of an open economy can and should design its system of 
capital income taxation, taking the policies of other countries as given, and assuming that extensive 
multilateral agreements on tax coordination are not politically feasible at the present stage of 
international political integration.2 
 The paper falls in three parts. Part 1 presents some theory and evidence on capital 
income taxation in the open economy. Part 2 discusses alternative blueprints for capital income tax 
reform in a globalising economy, and Part 3 summarizes and compares the main reform options. 
  
                                                 
1 I thank participants in the 2006 CESifo Venice Summer Institute for  comments on a previous version of this paper. 
Parts of the paper draw on joint work with Michael P. Devereux  (Devereux and Sørensen, 2005).  I am very grateful to 
him; he bears no responsibility for any errors.  
2 In Sørensen (2000, 2001, 2004a and 2004b) I have discussed various aspects of international tax coordination.  
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PART 1. CAPITAL INCOME TAXATION IN THE OPEN ECONOMY: THEORY AND 
SOME EVIDENCE 
1.1. Taxing capital income – some basic distinctions 
1.1.1. Taxes on saving versus taxes on investment 
Capital income takes many forms such as interest, dividends, capital gains, business 
profits, the value of the housing services enjoyed by owner-occupiers, etc. Some types of capital 
income are harder to tax than others, technically and politically, so in practice capital income tax 
systems tend to be highly complex, incoherent and discriminatory. I shall return to this problem 
later on. For the moment, I will focus on some basic theoretical distinctions which are fundamental 
for understanding the effects of capital income taxes.  
The first distinction is that between source-based and residence-based taxes on capital. 
Under the source principle (the return to) capital is taxed only in the country where it is invested. 
Source-based taxes may therefore be termed taxes on investment. Under the residence principle the 
tax is levied only on (the return to) the wealth owned by domestic residents, regardless of whether 
the wealth is invested at home or abroad. Since wealth is accumulated saving, residence-based taxes 
may also be termed taxes on saving. 
 The most important example of a source-based capital tax is the corporate income tax, 
since most countries only tax corporate income generated within their borders.3 In contrast, the 
personal income tax as well as the personal wealth tax are based on the residence principle, since 
domestic residents are liable to tax on their worldwide capital income and on wealth invested 
abroad as well as at home. As a rough approximation, we may therefore say that the corporation tax 
is a tax on investment, whereas the personal taxes on capital income and wealth are taxes on saving. 
 In an open economy with free international mobility of capital, the two types of taxes 
have very different effects on the domestic economy and on international capital flows.4 This is 
illustrated in Figure 1 where the horizontal axis measures the volumes of domestic saving and 
investment, while the vertical axis measures the real rates of return on saving and investment. The 
downward-sloping curve labelled ‘I’ indicates how the level of domestic investment varies with the 
                                                 
3 Some countries like the United States also levy domestic corporation tax on the profits that their multinational 
companies repatriate from abroad, but only to the extent that the domestic corporate tax exceeds the foreign corporation 
tax which has already been paid in the foreign source country. Moreover, in practice most of the profits earned by the 
foreign affiliates of multinational companies tend to be retained and reinvested in the host (source) country in which 
case the profit is taxed only in that country. As a first approximation, it is therefore fair to say that corporate income is 
taxed according to the source principle. 
4 For a formal treatment of this issue, stressing the implications for attempts to integrate the corporate and the personal 
income tax, see Boadway and Bruce (1992) and Fuest and Huber (2000). 
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required pre-tax rate of return. The lower is the required return, the greater is the volume of 
investment which will be deemed profitable. The upward-sloping curve denoted by ‘S’ shows how 
the level of domestic saving varies with the after-tax rate of return. The positive slope of this curve 
reflects the common assumption that a higher after-tax return will induce a higher volume of saving. 
 The horizontal curve labelled ‘r’ measures the cost of finance to domestic 
corporations. This is the rate of return that the investors providing the finance require after payment 
of corporation tax but before payment of any personal tax. If we consider a corporate investment 
financed by equity, then r is the required return on shares before payment of personal taxes on 
wealth and on dividends and capital gains on shares. If the investment is instead financed by debt, r 
is the rate of interest before personal taxes on interest and wealth. In Figure 1 the corporation tax is 
denoted by tI, so a corporate investment has to earn a minimum return rg = r + tI  to cover the 
corporation tax bill as well as the cost of finance. Hence the level of domestic corporate investment 
is given by Ie. Furthermore, when domestic personal taxes (denoted by tS) are deducted from the 
return r offered in the markets for shares and interest-bearing assets, domestic savers end up with an 
after-tax return equal to rn, so the level of domestic saving becomes Se. The excess of domestic 
investment over domestic saving has to be financed by capital imports from abroad, so in the 
example given in Figure 1 the volume of capital imports is given by the distance Ie – Se. 
In an open economy where investors can invest in foreign as well as domestic 
securities, the cost of finance r is given by the rate of return required in the international capital 
market. When the domestic economy is small, it does not have any noticeable impact on the 
international interest rate or the rate of return on shares required by international investors. Hence 
the level of r may be taken as given from the viewpoint of the small open economy. This means that 
personal taxes on saving do not have any impact on domestic investment. In Figure 1 a rise in the 
savings tax tS implies a movement down along the S-curve, leading to a lower volume of domestic 
saving and a higher level of capital imports without affecting domestic investment. In contrast, a 
rise in the investment tax  tI reduces the level of domestic investment and leads to lower capital 
imports but does not affect domestic saving.  
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Figure 1: Taxes on saving versus taxes on investment in a small open economy 
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This analysis has important implications for tax policy. In particular, it shows that if 
the government of a small open economy wishes to stimulate domestic real investment through 
lower taxes on capital, it should concentrate on lowering source-based taxes on investment such as 
the corporation tax. According to Figure 1, a lowering of savings taxes such as the personal taxes on 
dividends and capital gains on shares will not stimulate domestic investment. Rather, it will 
stimulate domestic saving and will most likely imply that some shares in domestic companies that 
were previously owned by foreign investors will be taken over by domestic investors, thus 
increasing the share of the domestic business sector controlled by domestic owners. 
 We should mention two important qualifications to the simplified analysis in Figure 1. 
First of all, although the personal tax on income and wealth is formally based on the residence 
principle, in practice it is often very difficult for the domestic tax authorities to monitor (the return 
to) a taxpayer’s personal wealth invested abroad, as discussed in section 1.5 below. For this reason 
even personal taxes on capital may in reality end up falling mainly on capital invested at home, as 
would be the case if the source principle were applied. 
 Second, the analysis in Figure 1 assumes that shares in domestic unquoted companies 
are perfect substitutes for shares which are traded in the international stock market so that the cost 
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of finance for small domestic unquoted companies is effectively determined in the international 
stock market. In practice the shares in domestic unquoted companies will tend to be imperfect 
substitutes for the shares of the large quoted companies, because the two types of shares will have 
different risk characteristics. In these circumstances domestic taxes on dividends and capital gains 
will have some effect on the cost of finance for small domestic companies which are not quoted in 
the stock exchange.5 
For both of these reasons a lowering of personal taxes on capital could have some 
positive influence on domestic investment, but the conclusion remains that the most powerful 
capital tax instrument to affect investment is a genuine source-based tax like the corporate income 
tax. Much of the discussion below will therefore concentrate on the corporation tax. 
  
1.1.2. Taxes on normal returns versus taxes on rents 
 The second fundamental distinction in the theory of capital income taxation is the one 
between taxes on the normal return to capital and taxes on rents. By definition, rents are ‘pure 
profits’ in excess of the going market of return on capital. For debt capital, the normal return is the 
market rate of interest on debt in the relevant risk class, and for equity it is the required market rate 
of return on stocks with the relevant risk characteristics. If markets for risk pooling are 
underdeveloped, the required risk premia will tend to be higher, and so will the normal return. 
 In a closed economy a tax on the normal return to capital will tend to reduce the 
volume of saving and investment (if the elasticity of saving with respect to the net return is positive) 
whereas a tax on pure rents will be non-distortionary. However, in the open economy a source-
based tax on rents will reduce domestic investment if the business activity generating the rent is 
internationally mobile, that is, if the firm is able to earn a similar excess return on investment in 
other countries. In that case we may speak of firm-specific or mobile rents. In other words, when the 
economy is open, a source-based tax will be non-distortionary only if it falls on location-specific 
(that is, immobile) rents. Location-specific rents may be generated by the exploitation of natural 
resources, by the presence of an attractive infrastructure, or by agglomeration forces (see section 
1.3.2 below), whereas firm-specific rents may arise from the possession of a specific technology, 
product brand or management know-how. 
                                                 
5 For a formal analysis of this issue, see Sørensen (2005c) 
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1.1.3. A fundamental proposition on capital income taxation in the open economy 
A fundamental theorem - originally derived by Gordon (1986) and forcefully restated 
by Razin and Sadka (1991) - states that in the absence of location-specific rents, a small open 
economy should not levy any source-based taxes on capital.6 Under perfect capital mobility a small 
open economy faces a perfectly elastic supply of capital from abroad, so the burden of a source-
based capital tax will be fully shifted onto workers and other immobile domestic factors via an 
outflow of capital which drives up the pre-tax return. In this process, the productivity of the 
domestic immobile factors will fall due to a lower capital intensity of production. To avoid this drop 
in productivity, it is more efficient to tax the immobile factors directly rather than indirectly via the 
capital tax. 
If governments pursue optimal tax policies, we should therefore expect to observe a 
gradual erosion of source-based capital income taxes in the recent decades marked by growing 
capital mobility. Is this actually happening? 
 
1.2. Trends in corporate income taxation: a puzzle 
To answer this question, let us look at the most important source-based capital income 
tax, i.e., the corporation tax. Here we are faced with a puzzle. On the one hand, the statutory 
corporate income tax rate has fallen significantly in almost all OECD countries since the early 
1980s, as illustrated in Figure 2. On the other hand, corporate tax revenues relative to GDP have 
actually increased in most countries, the main exceptions being Germany, Japan, and the UK, as 
shown in Figure 3. Hence the corporate income tax base must have grown sufficiently to 
(over)compensate for the drop in the statutory tax rate.  
To explore these trends in greater detail, it is useful to decompose the ratio of 
corporate tax revenue to GDP in the following manner: 
 
                                                   ( 1 )R R C P
Y C P Y
= i i   
                                                 
6 Gordon (op.cit.)  and Razin and Sadka (op.cit.) did not explicitly include rents in their analysis, but their reasoning 
implies that a source-based tax on perfectly mobile rents is no less distortionary than a source tax on the normal return, 
as pointed out by Gordon and Hines (2002). 
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Figure 2: Statutory corporation tax rates 
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Notes: For countries using different tax rates, the manufacturing rate is chosen. Local taxes (or the average 
across regions) are included where they exist. Any supplementary taxes are included only if they apply 
generally, rather than only under particular circumstances. Data for Denmark and Luxembourg are missing. 
Source: Devereux and Sørensen (2005), based on OECD data. 
 
Here R is total corporate tax revenue, Y is GDP, C is the total profit earned in the corporate sector, 
and P is the total profit earned in the economy as a whole. The fraction R/C may be seen as a rough 
indicator of the average effective corporate tax rate, since it measures total corporate taxes paid 
relative to the total pre-tax earnings of the corporate sector.7 Thus the decomposition suggested 
above will show whether an increase in the ratio of corporate tax revenue to GDP is due to an 
increase in the effective tax burden on the corporate sector, R/C; whether it reflects an increase in 
the share of total profits accruing to the corporate sector, C/P; or whether it is due to an increase in 
the profit share of total GDP, P/Y. 
                                                 
7 Of course this is a very primitive measure of the effective tax rate. Estimating effective tax rates is an academic 
industry in itself. For an overview and discussion of alternative methods, see Sørensen (ed., 2004). 
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Figure 3: Corporate tax revenue (% of GDP) 
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Notes: All taxes levied on profits and capital gains of corporations are included. 
Source: Devereux and Sørensen (2005), based on OECD data. 
 
 
In Figure 4 we have undertaken such a decomposition of the ratio of corporate tax 
revenue to GDP for a number of OECD countries for which the necessary national income statistics 
were available back to the early 1980s.8 Note that the concept of ‘profit’ adopted here is the OECD 
measure of ‘operating surplus’, defined as profit gross of interest and depreciation, i.e., a measure 
that is broader than the actual business income tax base. This explains why the estimated effective 
tax rates (R/C ) are relatively low compared to the statutory tax rates in Figure 2. To eliminate some 
of the cyclical fluctuations in the data, Figure 4 shows three-year moving averages centred on the 
year indicated on the horizontal axis. We see that in most of the countries the ratio of corporate 
profits to total profits has tended to increase, reflecting the growing importance of the corporate 
organizational form. Thus part of the reason why governments have managed to stabilize or even  
                                                 
8 We left out Germany because of lack of a time series of sufficient length. We also left out Norway, where corporate 
tax revenues are heavily influenced by fluctuations in the petroleum sector, and Japan where developments have been 
strongly affected by the protracted economic crisis of the 1990s. 
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Figure 4: The ratio of corporate tax revenue to GDP and its components (percent) 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on  OECD National Accounts. 
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increase the ratio of corporate tax revenues to GDP is that the corporate sector has tended to expand 
at the expense of non-corporate firms. In part this may reflect the secular decline of certain sectors 
such as agriculture where the non-corporate organizational form has tended to dominate, but it may 
also reflect income-shifting into the corporate sector induced by the large drops in statutory 
corporate tax rates.9 In both cases the  gain in corporate tax revenue will tend to be offset by a loss 
of revenue from the personal income tax. However, none of the countries shown in Figure 4 have 
experienced a significant drop in their aggregate effective corporate tax rate (R/C), and in several 
countries such as Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and France, the effective corporate tax rate 
even seems to have increased. In other words, it seems that governments have made up for the drop 
in statutory tax rates by broadening the corporate tax base, e.g., by eliminating special deductions 
and moving towards less generous rules for asset depreciation etc., in line with the tax-cut-cum-
base-broadening philosophy that became popular in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
1.3 Why do source-based capital income taxes survive? 
1.3.1. Reasons for the viability of source taxation 
 Whereas the basic theory of optimal taxation suggests that globalisation will gradually 
wipe out source-based capital income taxation, we have seen that corporation tax revenues have 
actually been very robust in recent decades. This section briefly discusses various reasons why 
source-based capital income taxes may be able to survive despite growing capital mobility.10 
 Location-specific rents. If firms can earn above-normal returns by investing in a 
particular location, the government of that jurisdiction may impose some amount of source tax 
without scaring investors away. There are many potential sources of location-specific rents such as 
the existence of natural resources, an attractive infrastructure, availability of a pool of qualified 
labour and, more generally, the existence of ‘agglomeration forces’ (to be elaborated in section 
1.3.2). Moreover, when location-specific rents co-exist with foreign ownership of (part of) the 
domestic capital stock, the incentive for national governments to levy source-based capital taxes is 
strengthened, since they can thereby export part of the domestic tax burden to foreigners whose 
votes do not count in the domestic political process (see Huizinga and Nielsen (1997)). Since 
globalisation implies increased international cross-hauling of investment and a resulting increase in 
foreign ownership shares, this may be an important reason why governments choose to maintain 
source-based capital income taxes, as suggested by Mintz (1994). Indeed, using European data, 
                                                 
9 Fuest and Weichenrieder (2002) offer evidence that such income-shifting is indeed taking place. 
10 For a further discussion of this issue, see Zodrow (2006). 
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Huizinga and Nicodéme (2003) found evidence of a significant positive relationship between 
average effective corporate tax rates and the share of domestic companies owned by foreigners. 
Nevertheless, since a source tax on the normal return can be fully shifted under perfect capital 
mobility, the factors mentioned above do not explain why governments choose to levy a 
distortionary source tax on the full return to capital rather than taxing only rents, e.g., by allowing a 
deduction for the normal return to capital. I return to this issue at the end of this subsection.   
 Imperfect capital mobility. The prediction that source taxes on capital will vanish 
assumes that capital is perfectly mobile. In practice, there are costs of adjusting stocks of physical 
capital so such capital cannot move instantaneously and costlessly across borders. Since adjustment 
costs tend to rise more than proportionally with the magnitude of the capital stock adjustment, the 
domestic capital stock will only fall gradually over time in response to the imposition of a source-
based capital income tax (see Wildasin (2000)). In present value terms, the burden of the tax 
therefore cannot be fully shifted onto domestic immobile factors, and hence a government 
concerned about equity may want to impose a source-based capital tax, particularly if it has a short 
horizon. Another reason for imperfect capital mobility may be that financial instruments (in 
particular shares) issued in different countries are imperfect substitutes because they have different 
risk characteristics, as will be the case when returns in different national stock markets are not 
perfectly correlated. Investors will then want to hold securities issued in different countries to 
diversify their portfolios, and individual countries will have some market power over the price of 
equity in domestic firms. Governments may exploit this market power by imposing withholding 
taxes at source on returns on domestic equity paid out to foreign investors, just as a country with 
international market power may want to impose an optimal tariff (see Gordon and Varian (1989)). 
Gordon (2000, p. 31) points out that a roughly similar result may be achieved by imposing a source-
based corporation tax and granting a personal tax credit for the corporation tax only to domestic 
shareholders, as many governments have actually done. Governments may also exploit the fact that 
different types of business activity have different degrees of international mobility by granting 
selective tax cuts to the most mobile activities. This is the background for the proliferation of the 
special tax regimes which are the targets of the OECD initiative against ‘harmful tax competition’ 
and of the EU Code of Conduct for business taxation.11 
 Foreign tax credits. Some important capital exporting countries like the US, UK and 
Japan try to tax the worldwide profits of their multinational corporations while allowing a foreign 
                                                 
11 For further discussion of these initiatives, see Eggert and Haufler (2006). 
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tax credit for taxes paid abroad, up to a limit given by the amount of domestic tax on the foreign 
source income. In these cases the foreign host (source) countries have an obvious incentive to levy a 
source-based corporation tax, since they can do so without reducing the incentive of foreign 
multinationals to invest in the domestic economy, as long as the domestic corporation tax does not 
exceed the corporation tax levied by the home (residence) country of the multinational company. It 
is less clear why the home country government would want to offer a foreign tax credit which 
effectively amounts to a give-away of revenue to foreign host governments. Gordon (1992) argues 
that foreign tax credits are offered exactly because they give an incentive for foreign host countries 
to levy source-based taxes up to the limit given by the domestic tax rate. In this way the foreign tax 
credit enables the home country to tax domestic investment without inducing a capital flight from 
the domestic economy. However, as recognized by Gordon himself (Gordon (2000), pp. 27-28), this 
argument rests inter alia on the counterfactual assumption that home countries tax foreign source 
income upon accrual. In practice, home country tax is typically levied only when income is 
repatriated from abroad. As long as profits are retained and reinvested abroad, only the host country 
tax rate matters for the cost of capital, as Hartman (1985) showed, and taxation at the margin is then 
effectively source-based. Moreover, a large number of countries explicitly adhere to the source 
principle by exempting foreign source corporate income from domestic corporation tax. Overall, 
Gordon and Hines (2002) find it difficult to argue that crediting arrangements have a significant 
impact on host country corporate tax rates. 
 The corporation tax as a backstop to the personal income tax. One important function 
of the corporate income tax is to serve as a ‘backstop’ for the personal income tax. The corporation 
tax falls not only on returns to (equity) capital but also on the labour income generated by 
entrepreneurs working in their own company. In the absence of a corporation tax, taxpayers could 
shift labour income and capital income into the corporate sector and accumulate it free of tax while 
financing consumption by loans from their companies. Still, while it is easy to see why protection 
of the domestic personal tax base may require a corporation tax on companies owned by domestic 
residents, it is not obvious why it requires a source-based corporation tax on foreign-owned 
companies whose shareholders are not liable to domestic personal tax. However, as pointed out by 
Zodrow (2006, p. 272), if foreign-owned companies were exempt from domestic corporate income 
tax, it might be relatively easy to establish corporations that are nominally foreign-owned but are 
really controlled by domestic taxpayers, say, via a foreign tax haven. Hence the backstop function 
of the corporation tax may be eroded if it is not levied on foreign-owned companies.  
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 Political constraints. Finally, even though it may be inefficient to tax capital income 
at source, the voting public may not realize that such a tax tends to be shifted to the immobile 
factors, so levying a source-based corporation tax may be a political necessity, since abolition of 
such a tax would be seen as a give-away to the rich, including rich foreign investors. More 
generally, if there are political limits to the amount of (explicit) taxes that can be levied on other 
bases, it may be necessary for a government with a high revenue requirement to raise some amount 
of revenue via a source-based capital income tax, even if such a tax is highly distortionary. 
Governments could then try to restructure the corporation tax to reduce the inevitable distortions. 
For example, by broadening the corporate tax base and lowering the statutory rate, a country may be 
able to raise a given amount of corporate tax revenue in a more efficient manner. One reason is that 
a lower statutory tax rate makes a country less vulnerable to international profit-shifting through 
transfer-pricing and thin capitalization etc., as emphasized by Haufler and Schjelderup (2000). 
Another reason may be that a low statutory tax rate is particularly beneficial for highly profitable 
companies which are often multinationals earning firm-specific mobile rents from the exploitation 
of special technologies, brand names etc. Keeping the statutory tax rate low may thus be a way of 
attracting the type of high-tech investment that gives rise to positive spillovers to the domestic 
economy. In summary, a perceived political need to raise a certain amount of revenue from the 
corporation tax combined with the incentives to lower the statutory tax rate in a globalising 
economy may help to explain the policy of tax-cut-cum-base-broadening pursued by most OECD 
governments in recent decades.12 
  
1.3.2. Agglomeration, trade costs and the future of capital income taxes 
 As noted above, location-specific rents are one important reason why source-based 
capital taxes may be sustained. The modern theory of economic geography (e.g., Baldwin et al., 
(2003), Baldwin and Krugman (2002) and Kind et al. (2000)) highlights how such rents are created 
and destroyed. It also suggests that the link between economic integration and taxation is more 
complex than previously thought. This theory seeks to explain the geographical pattern of economic 
activity by accounting for transportation costs as well as other barriers to international trade. 
Specifically, the theory identifies factors which tend to disperse economic activities across the 
geographical space as well as factors working in favour of a geographical concentration 
(agglomeration) of activities. When firms deliver inputs to each other and there are costs of long-
                                                 
12 Undoubtedly, this policy was also partly motivated by a desire to reduce domestic distortions to resource allocation 
by creating a more level playing field for domestic investment. 
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distance trade in inputs, they can save on transportation costs by locating near each other. Thus 
forward-linkages (input deliveries) among firms create an incentive for agglomeration. This 
incentive increases if agglomeration also stimulates technological spillovers among firms, for 
example, by making it easier for them to observe and learn from each others’ production processes. 
On the other hand, firms also compete with each other in final product markets, so  if 
product markets are to some extent geographically segmented due to transport costs, increased 
concentration of activity in one location will tend to intensify competition and drive down profit 
margins in that local market. This crowding effect creates an incentive for firms to operate in 
different locations to reduce the intensity of competition. However, if the crowding effect is not too 
strong, firms will tend to agglomerate (concentrate) in certain geographical areas. As a result of the 
cost savings arising from agglomeration, firms will earn location-specific rents in these areas, and 
these rents can be taxed away via the corporation tax without inducing firms to relocate to other 
jurisdictions. 
Economic integration is driven by lower trade costs which reduces the individual 
firm’s cost advantage of being close to the suppliers of its intermediate inputs. Clearly this tends to 
reduce the location-specific rents from agglomeration, thereby reducing the scope for source-based 
taxation. At the same time lower trade costs increases the scope for price competition via long-
distance trade in final products. This will reduce the crowding effect from agglomeration, since the 
degree of competition becomes less dependent on the geographical closeness of the individual 
firm’s competitors. Obviously a smaller crowding effect tends to increase the location-specific rent 
from agglomeration. It is quite possible that this latter effect of lower trade costs may be stronger 
than the former one, in which case lower trade costs will induce governments in countries with 
many agglomerations to increase their tax rates. 
In fact models of economic geography typically imply a non-monotonic relationship 
between trade costs and the rents from agglomeration: starting from relatively high trade costs, a 
fall in these costs will at first tend to increase the location-specific rents from agglomeration, but 
when trade costs fall below a certain level, a further fall will reduce the agglomeration rents, as 
illustrated in Figure 5. The intuition is straightforward: with very high trade costs, there is no scope 
for trade in intermediate and final goods, so local markets can only be served by local firms, leaving 
no room for a geographical concentration of production and the associated agglomeration rents. At 
the other end of the spectrum, if trade costs are zero the price of inputs and the degree of 
competition in product markets becomes quite independent of the geographical location of 
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production, so again there are no agglomeration forces. It follows that if there is any potential for 
agglomeration rents at all, these rents must initially rise from zero to some positive level as trade 
costs start to come down from a very high level, but at some point if trade costs continue to fall, 
agglomeration rents must start to decline again. 
This suggests that, in the early stages of economic integration, a move towards more 
integration may well increase the scope for taxation of mobile factors for a while. But as integration 
deepens and trade costs lose importance, the location-specific rents that enable governments to levy 
source taxes without deterring inward investment tend to get wiped out. Thus, if the recent wave of 
globalisation has so far involved a leftward move from a starting point to the right of the maximum 
of the curve in Figure 5, rising agglomeration rents may help to explain the observed robustness of 
corporate tax revenues, but according to the theory of economic geography this is no guarantee that 
source-based capital taxes can be maintained in the future if trade costs continue to fall. Although 
those who fear a race to the bottom in capital income taxes may seem to have cried ‘wolf’ too many 
times, the wolf may yet show up some day! 
 
Figure 5. The relationship between trade costs and the rents from agglomeration 
 
 
Trade costs
Rents from 
agglomeration 
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1.4. Should the normal return to capital be taxed? 
From a theoretical viewpoint, there is an obvious case for a tax on rents, since such a 
tax is in principle non-distortionary, at least if the rents are location-specific. A long-standing 
debate in the theory of taxation is whether governments should also tax the normal return to capital. 
This section reviews the main arguments in this perennial debate.13 
 As we have seen, a source-based tax on the normal return tends to be shifted onto the 
immobile domestic factors, so in the open economy a genuine tax on the normal return to saving 
must be residence-based, falling on income from foreign as well as domestic sources. The next 
section discusses whether the residence principle can actually be implemented, but in order to 
distinguish normative theoretical arguments from administrative concerns, the present section 
assumes that a residence-based capital income tax can indeed be enforced. 
A tax on the normal return to saving increases the relative price of future consumption 
by raising the amount of present consumption that has to be given up to allow a unit increase in 
future consumption. Hence a capital income tax (on the normal return) may be seen as a selective 
commodity tax on future consumption. As argued by Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985), in the long 
run such a tax seems very hard to defend in an economy where consumers behave as if they have an 
infinite time horizon, say, because generations are linked through altruistic bequests in the manner 
described by Barro (1974). To see why, note that from the standpoint of period zero, the relative 
price of consumption in some future period T (i.e., the amount by which consumption in period 0 
must be cut in order to increase consumption in period T by one unit) is 
( ) ( )0 0
11 1             (2)
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where rt  is the pre-tax rate of return on saving in period t and τt is the capital income tax rate for 
that period. The last bracket in this expression measures the tax-induced distortion to the  relative 
price of future consumption. This distortion to PT will be larger the longer the consumer’s time 
horizon T, and as the horizon tends to infinity, the tax distortion becomes infinitely large. Clearly it 
is hard to think of circumstances in which it would be optimal to impose an infinitely large tax 
distortion, and Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) do indeed find that in the long run the capital 
income tax rate should be lowered to zero even if the alternative pubic revenue sources are also 
                                                 
13 Parts of  this section draw on Sørensen (2005b). Bernheim (2002) and Auerbach (2006) also review some of the main 
arguments in the debate on the optimal taxation of capital income. 
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distortionary, and even if the government is concerned about equity as well as efficiency.14 To be 
sure, in the short and medium run where the relative price distortion caused by capital income 
taxation is finite, it is typically optimal to levy a positive capital income tax, but in a standard 
Ramsey type infinite-horizon model the tax rate should gradually be lowered as the size of the 
distortion increases. 
 This policy conclusion assumes that capital markets are perfect so that consumers may 
freely reallocate their consumption over time through borrowing and lending. If intertemporal 
substitution in consumption is restricted by borrowing constraints, consumers can respond only to a 
limited extent to the relative price distortions caused by capital income taxation. When labor 
income is uncertain and insurance markets are incomplete, it may then be optimal to levy a capital 
income tax even if consumers have infinite horizons (see Aiyagari (1993) and Chamley (2001)). 
With constraints on borrowing, consumers will engage in precautionary saving to hedge against 
future rainy days, and consumption at any given date will tend to be positively correlated with 
accumulated precautionary saving. A tax on (income from) capital that finances a lump-sum 
transfer will then help to redistribute income from high consumption states to low consumption 
states, thereby performing an insurance function that the market cannot provide.15 
 A limitation of infinite-horizon models is that many consumers may not behave as if 
they live forever. For example, they may not have any heirs or may not care sufficiently about them 
to leave them any positive bequests, or their bequest motive may be selfish rather than altruistic. 
Many scholars have therefore studied optimal capital income taxation in models with finite 
consumer horizons such as the Diamond life cycle overlapping-generations model. In such models 
several rationales for a positive capital income tax rate have been identified, including the 
following: 
Complementarity between leisure and future consumption. As pointed out long ago  
by Corlett and Hague (1953), a commodity tax system which minimizes deadweight loss will 
impose heavier taxes on goods that are more complementary to (less substitutable for) leisure 
should carry a relatively high tax rate, since this will minimize tax-induced substitution towards 
leisure. Because a capital income tax is a tax on future consumption, the Corlett-Hague rule implies 
                                                 
14 Another way of explaining this result is to note that, in the Ramsey infinite horizon model, the after-tax steady-state 
interest rate is closely tied to the consumer’s exogenous utility discount rate, so a capital income tax gets fully shifted 
onto the pre-tax interest rate. Effectively this means that savings are infinitely elastic in the long run, and clearly it is 
inoptimal to tax a factor in infinitely elastic supply. 
15 Allowing for an arbitrary length of consumer horizons (finite or infinite), Golosov et al. (2003) also find that the 
optimal capital income tax rate is positive when labour income is stochastic, even in circumstances where a zero capital 
income tax rate would be optimal under perfect foresight. 
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that we should tax (subsidize) capital income if future consumption is more (less) complementary to 
leisure than present consumption. In the benchmark case where preferences are separable in 
consumption and leisure so that current and future consumption are equally substitutable for leisure, 
we have the powerful theorem of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) that a government concerned about 
equity as well as efficiency will not want to differentiate taxes across commodities (and hence 
should not impose a capital income tax), provided it can use a progressive non-linear labour income 
tax to achieve its distributional goals. The intuition for the Atkinson-Stiglitz result is clear: there is 
no second-best efficiency case for distorting the choice between present and future consumption 
when these goods are equally substitutable for leisure; nor is there any equity case for imposing a 
tax on future consumption, since a wage income tax is a better targeted instrument for redistributing 
income in a world where innate differences in labour productivity is (assumed to be) the only source 
of inequality. A widespread view among public finance economists is that we do not know whether 
future consumption is more or less substitutable for leisure than present consumption, so based on 
the principle of insufficient reason, we should assume equal degrees of substitutability. The 
Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem then immediately leads to the prescription of a zero tax rate on the 
normal return to capital. This view has recently been challenged by Erosa and Gervais (2002). They 
show that for any reasonable parameterization, a standard life cycle overlapping-generations model 
implies that consumption and leisure generally move together over time at the level of the 
individual consumer. In other words, if life cycle models provide a reasonable approximation to 
reality, it is reasonable to assume that future consumption is more complementary to leisure than 
present consumption, and hence it is efficient to tax future consumption via a capital income tax. 
The simulations undertaken by Erosa and Gervais (op.cit.) indicate that the optimal capital income 
tax rate is indeed significantly above zero for any plausible parameterization of the life cycle OLG 
model. 
Mimicking age-dependent labour income taxation. Erosa and Gervais (2002) also 
point out that the elasticity of labour supply with respect to the relative price of leisure tends to 
increase with age in a realistic life cycle model. Ideally, the government would therefore want to 
impose an age-dependent  labour income tax, with a marginal tax rate that declines with age. If the 
labour income tax cannot be conditioned on age, the government can (imperfectly) imitate an age-
dependent labour tax by levying a positive capital income tax. To see this, note that if the marginal 
after-tax wage rate in some future period T is WT, the relative price of leisure in that period (as seen 
from the present when the  consumer plans the time profile of his labour supply) is PT WT, where PT  
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is given by equation (2) above. By imposing a capital income tax τt the government can thus raise 
the relative price of leisure in later stages of the consumer’s life cycle where labour supply tends to 
be more elastic. 
Capital-skill complementarity and endogenous factor prices. The analysis of Atkinson 
and Stiglitz (1976) was static and did not allow for the fact that saving for future consumption 
induces capital accumulation which in turn affects pre-tax factor incomes. However, subsequent 
research has shown that, provided the government has other instruments (such as debt policy or 
public investment) to steer the capital stock towards its socially optimal level, a zero steady-state 
capital income tax rate remains optimal in explicitly dynamic OLG models with capital 
accumulation, as long as utility functions are weakly separable in consumption and leisure (see 
Ordover and Phelps (1979)). But the reason why dynamic models of capital accumulation confirm 
the optimality of a zero capital income tax is that capital accumulation does not affect the 
distribution of pre-tax wage rates in these models: a higher capital stock simply raises the level of 
real wages in the same proportion across all skill types. Yet there is strong empirical evidence that 
skilled labour is more complementary to capital than unskilled labour (see, e.g., Krusell et al., 
(2000) and Lindquist (2005)), implying that capital accumulation will tend to raise the relative 
wages of skilled workers. In that case capital accumulation means that a skilled worker has to work 
fewer hours to earn the same income as an unskilled worker. Ceteris paribus, this makes it more 
attractive for a skilled worker to mimic an unskilled worker, so the non-mimicking constraint that 
limits the government’s ability to redistribute income from the high-skilled to the low-skilled 
becomes tighter. To offset this, it becomes optimal for a government concerned about equity to 
dampen saving and capital accumulation through a positive capital income tax, as shown by Salanié 
(2003, p. 143). 
 Offsetting the labour tax distortion to human capital investment. Bovenberg and 
Jacobs (2005a) have pointed to another rationale for a positive capital income tax: when human 
capital investment is endogenous and its opportunity cost is not fully tax deductible (say, because 
part of the opportunity cost is a non-pecuniary cost of effort), a labour income tax will discourage 
human capital formation and induce consumers to substitute financial capital for human capital. If 
the government can fully observe all human capital investments and their related opportunity costs, 
education subsidies are the most well-targeted instrument to offset the labour tax distortion to 
human capital investment, as Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005b) have shown in a companion paper. 
However, realistically governments cannot verify all human capital investments and their associated 
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costs. In that case it becomes second-best optimal to supplement education subsidies by a positive 
capital income tax to offset the tendency of the labour income tax to favour financial investment 
over human capital investment. The more the government wishes to redistribute income through a 
progressive labour income tax, higher is the optimal capital income tax rate needed to offset 
distortions to human capital investment. 
In summary, recent research has shown that a case for a positive capital income tax 
rate can be made both on efficiency and equity grounds. 
1.5. Can taxes on saving be enforced? 
 While there may be a normative case for a positive residence-based tax on the normal 
return to saving, tax economists tend to argue that the residence principle cannot be enforced in 
practice, since governments cannot effectively monitor foreign source income in the absence of 
systematic international exchange of information among tax authorities. To be sure, bilateral tax 
treaties do provide for exchange of information on specific taxpayers upon request from the 
residence country, and sometimes treaties also encourage ‘spontaneous’ provision of specific 
information by the source country, but is is widely agreed that information exchange on such 
limited scale is insufficient to bring all foreign source capital income into the tax net of residence 
countries. According to the pessimistic but widespread view expressed by Tanzi and Zee (2001), the 
basic problem is that source countries seem to have no interest in providing information since they 
thereby make themselves less attractive as a haven for foreign investors. 
 However, some authors have recently tried to identify circumstances in which it 
would indeed be in the mutual interest of source and residence countries to engage in systematic 
international information exchange (see, e.g., Bacchetta and Espinosa (2000), Eggert and Kolmar 
(2002), Huizinga and Nielsen (2003), and Keen and Ligthart (2006)). In particular, Keen and 
Ligthart (op.cit.) show that if the residence country is willing to transfer an appropriate share of its 
revenue gain from information exchange to the source country, both countries will benefit from 
systematic information exchange. 
 Moreover, recent years have seen significant progress in international cooperation on 
information exchange. As part of the OECD initiative to counter ‘harmful tax practices’, 30 out of 
35 jurisdictions originally identified as international tax havens have now committed themselves to 
providing information to foreign tax authorities, and under the recent EU agreement on the so-
called savings directive, 22 out of 25 EU member states have implemented automatic information 
exchange from July 2005. The remaining three member countries will adopt information exchange 
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from 2011, relying on withholding taxes until then. To make the switch to information exchange 
more attractive to these member states, the EU savings directive contains an innovative clause 
requiring them to transfer 75 percent of the revenue from withholding taxes to the residence 
country. 
 Still, it must be acknowledged that as long as some jurisdictions refuse to cooperate 
on information exchange, wealthy investors may be able to escape residence country tax by hiding 
away their wealth in foreign accounts. Yet governments may be able to collect some revenue from 
taxes on saving due to the well-documented ‘home bias’ in investor portfolios, i.e., the fact that 
financial investors (especially small ones) tend to invest the bulk of their wealth at home rather than 
abroad (see, e.g., French and Poterba (1993)). In part this home bias may reflect that (small) 
investors are less well informed about foreign than about domestic investment opportunities (see 
Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) and Westerhout (2002)). It may also reflect that returns on domestic 
equity tend to be negatively correlated with domestic wage rates, giving domestic workers a 
hedging motive to invest in domestic rather than foreign shares, as argued by Bottazzi et al. (1996). 
Whatever its source may be, the persistence of home bias clearly enables governments to levy some 
amount of tax on the savings of domestic residents without inducing a capital flight, even though it 
is less clear that a positive capital income tax rate is indeed optimal when only domestic-source 
income can be taxed (see Gordon (2000) for a further discussion of this point). 
 This last observation takes us back to the question of the administrative feasibility of 
residence-based taxation. Although (small) domestic household investors tend to have zero or only 
small direct holdings of foreign assets in their portfolios, a large part of household saving is 
channelled through institutional investors such as mutual funds, pension funds and life insurance 
companies that may hold significant amounts of foreign assets. Because of their limited number and 
public reporting requirements, the foreign source income of such institutional investors is much 
easier to monitor than the foreign income of individual households. Given the strong revealed 
household preference for channelling saving through these financial intermediaries, it should be 
technically possible to enforce residence-based taxation of the return to most of private sector 
saving by collecting the tax at the level of the institutional investors. In fact, Denmark and Sweden 
do tax the return to retirement savings undertaken via banks, pension funds and life insurance 
companies.16 Still, the international norm is to exempt the return to retirement saving from tax, but 
                                                 
16 The tax rate is rather modest, however, amounting to 15 percent in both countries. While the Danish tax is levied on 
the actual accrued return on the assets of the institutional investor, the Swedish tax is levied on an imputed return equal 
to the average interest rate on government bonds. 
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this suggests that the failures of governments in implementing the residence principle stem to a 
large extent from a deliberate political choice to exempt a big chunk of capital income from tax. 
 
1.6. Do we actually collect any revenue from taxing normal returns? 
Indeed, there are several indications that governments do not really want to tax the 
most important forms of capital income. In most OECD countries the three main forms of private 
saving are i) savings for retirement; ii) saving in home equity, and iii) retained corporate profits. As 
already noted, the return to retirement savings is typically tax exempt. The return to owner-occupied 
housing is the value of the housing service, but hardly any country attempts to levy a tax on 
imputed rents at a realistic rate, and many countries do not tax imputed rents at all. Finally, while 
retained corporate profits do bear corporation tax, the corporate income tax rate is often much lower 
than the top marginal personal income tax rate, and capital gains on corporate shares are often tax 
exempt or taxed at concessionary rates. 
Against this background, it is not surprising that several studies have found that 
current tax systems collect practically no revenue from taxes on the normal return to capital. For 
example, Gordon and Slemrod (1988) estimated that in 1983 tax revenue in the United States would 
have slightly increased in present value terms if the US had eliminated all personal taxes on capital 
income and all deductions for interest expenses and had allowed expensing rather than depreciation 
of investment spending on physical capital (thus effectively switching to a  cash flow business tax 
which is known to fall only on pure rents). For 1995, Gordon, Kalambokidis and Slemrod (2001) 
estimated a slightly positive net revenue from the corporation tax on the normal return, but the 
revenue only amounted to 4 percent of total corporate profits.  Sørensen (1988) found that personal 
capital income taxes in Denmark generated significant net revenue losses in the mid-1980s, and 
Becker and Fuest (2005) recently estimated that a switch to a consumption tax in Germany – which 
would amount to exemption for the normal return to saving – would at most cause a revenue loss of 
1.6 percent of GDP and might even yield a net revenue gain.  
The fact that so little revenue is raised from taxes on normal returns does not mean 
that existing capital income taxes are roughly non-distortionary. On the contrary, since the capital 
income tax base is not adjusted for inflation, the marginal effective tax rate on some forms of saving 
and investment may be quite high, whereas other forms of saving and investment may receive big 
tax subsidies. For example, if all of the nominal interest income is subject to full personal tax, the 
effective tax rate on the real interest income may be quite stiff even at modest rates of inflation. On 
 24
the other hand, in countries that allow deduction for mortgage interest payments without taxing 
imputed rents, investment in owner-occupied housing will tend to be heavily subsidized by the tax 
system. Thus, even though on average the tax wedge between the marginal pre-tax return on 
investment and the marginal after-tax return to saving may be quite low, current systems of capital 
income taxation probably imply large distortions to the pattern of saving and investment. These 
observations explain why so many tax economists tend to favour some form of consumption-based 
taxation which would leave the normal return to capital free of tax. If so little revenue is raised at 
the cost of such big distortions, why don’t we simply give up the idea of taxing the normal return? 
In the next part of this paper I will discuss how the tax system of an open economy 
could be redesigned if governments only wish to tax rents, but I will also discuss how policy 
makers could reform the system of capital income taxation if they want to make a serious attempt at 
taxing normal returns. 
 
 
 PART 2. CAPITAL INCOME TAX REFORM IN THE OPEN ECONOMY 
2.1.  A classification of alternative blueprints for capital income tax reform 
 In most OECD countries the corporate income tax is a cornerstone of the system of 
capital income taxation. The corporation tax typically raises a lot more revenue than any other form 
of capital income tax, and its importance is even bigger than suggested by the revenue statistics 
because it serves as a backstop to the personal  income tax, as mentioned earlier. Hence most of the 
discussion below will focus on the corporate income tax, although section 2.3 will also consider the 
role of other capital income taxes. 
 Since interest payments are deductible from the corporate tax base and are often 
lightly taxed in the hands of the recipient, say, because they accrue to tax exempt institutional 
investors, the system of capital income taxation tends to favour debt finance over equity finance. 
Further, dividends are often taxed at a higher effective rate than the capital gains on shares arising 
from retained corporate profits, so the tax system also tends to favour equity finance through 
retained earnings rather than finance via new equity. Apart from distorting financing decisions, the 
corporate tax system may distort real investment decisions through depreciation schemes that allow 
depreciation for tax purposes to deviate from the true economic depreciation. Finally, the 
corporation tax may distort the choice between corporate and non-corporate forms of business 
organization. 
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 Over the years, many capital income tax reforms in OECD countries have been 
motivated by a desire to reduce these well-known distortions. In recent years policy makers have 
also paid increasing attention to reform proposals intended to make the corporate tax system more 
robust in a world of growing mobility of capital and of taxable profits. Against this background, 
Table 1 offers a classification of alternative ways of taxing corporate source income in an open 
economy.17 The rows in the table categorize the different tax systems according to the location of 
the tax base. Specifically, the tax base may be the corporate income earned in the source country 
where production takes place; it may be the income earned in the residence country of the 
company’s corporate or personal shareholders, or it may be the sales (net of costs) to the destination 
country where the final consumption of the company’s products occurs. The choice between these 
alternative tax bases may have important implications for the allocation of capital and economic 
activity between the domestic and the foreign economy. 
The columns in Table 1 classify the different capital income tax systems according to the 
type of income subject to tax. Traditionally, the corporation tax has been levied on the full return to 
corporate equity income which includes the normal return as well as pure rents. Alternatively, the 
corporation tax might be levied on the full return to all capital invested in the corporate sector, 
including debt capital. Finally, a number of reform proposals would impose corporation tax only on 
rents, leaving the normal return free of tax. Alternative policy choices in this dimension will affect 
the degree to which the corporation tax distorts the investment, financing and production activities 
of companies, and they may also affect international location decisions. 
Existing corporate income taxes typically belong to categories 1 or 2 in Table 1. Under these 
tax regimes the source country has the prime right to levy tax on corporate profits after deduction 
for interest payments. The residence country of a multinational parent company may then either 
exempt the income from foreign corporate affiliates from domestic tax (category 1), or it may 
subject foreign source profits to domestic corporate income tax but grant a credit for the source 
country tax against the domestic tax bill (category 2). Under the credit system the domestic tax on 
‘active’ business income is typically deferred until the time of repatriation of foreign source 
income. For this reason, and because the foreign tax credit typically cannot exceed the amount of 
domestic tax on the foreign income, the effects on investment incentives of such ’worldwide’  
 
                                                 
17 To limit the scope of this paper, I have deliberately left several empty cells in Table 1 and have chosen to focus only 
on those reform options that have been most widely discussed in the international tax policy debate. 
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Table 1. Alternative systems of capital income taxation 
 
Type of income subject to business tax 
 
 
 
Location of 
tax base  
Full return to equity 
 
 
Full return to capital 
 
 
Rent 
 
 
 
 
Source country 
 
1. Conventional 
corporate income tax 
with exemption of 
foreign source income 
 
 
4. Dual Income Tax; 
 
5. Comprehensive 
Business Income Tax 
 
6. Corporation tax with 
an Allowance for 
Corporate Equity;  
7. Source-based cash 
flow corporation tax 
 
 
 
Residence country of 
corporate head office 
 
 
2. Residence-based 
corporate income tax 
with a credit for foreign 
taxes 
 
  
 
Residence country of 
personal shareholders 
 
 
3. Residence-based  
shareholder tax 
 
  
 
 
 
Destination country of 
final consumption 
 
   
8. VAT-type 
destination-based cash 
flow tax 
 
  
 
taxation are rather similar to the effects of the pure source-based system in category 1.18 Some 
countries integrate the corporate and the personal income tax by offering a credit for (part of) the 
corporation tax against the personal taxes levied on shareholders. However, these countries 
typically do not extend such tax credits to foreign owners of shares in domestic companies. 
 As a first approximation, it is therefore fair to say that existing corporate income taxes 
are source-based, as we have noted previously. Given the high mobility of capital and the 
opportunities for international profit-shifting through transfer-pricing, royalty payments and thin 
                                                 
18 When the limitation on the foreign tax credit is binding, the net tax paid on the foreign income is equal to the foreign 
tax rate and the tax collected by the residence country of the parent company is zero, as would be the case under a pure 
source-based tax system. 
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capitalization, a source-based tax system is vulnerable to tax competition from foreign jurisdictions. 
This may be termed “the capital flight problem”. All the reform proposals included in Table 1 can 
be seen as an attempt to reduce this problem in one way or another (as well as an attempt to create 
greater tax neutrality in the domestic sphere). Thus, a residence-based tax seeks to avoid the 
problem of capital flight by imposing the same effective tax rate on residents’ investment at home 
and abroad and by exempting inward foreign investment from domestic tax. A source-based 
corporation tax with an equity allowance and a source-based cash flow tax potentially reduce the 
capital flight problem by exempting the normal international return to capital from tax, recognizing 
that this tax is likely to be shifted onto domestic immobile factors anyway. Furthermore, a 
destination-based cash flow tax provides no incentive to locate investment abroad rather than at 
home, and in its VAT type form it also avoids the problem of international profit-shifting, as we 
shall see. Finally, the Comprehensive Business Income Tax and the Dual Income Tax seek to 
address the capital flight problem by broadening the tax base to keep the tax rate low. 
The following sections briefly discuss the various options for capital income tax reform 
summarized in Table 1. I start in section 2.2 by considering alternatives to source-based taxation, 
i.e., residence-based and destination-based taxes. The main rationale for these reform options is that 
they tend to minimise the distortionary impact of taxation on corporate location decisions. In 
section 2.3 I proceed to discuss alternative forms of source-based taxation which are arguably easier 
to implement than residence-based taxes. In both sections I consider taxes that fall on the full return 
to (equity) capital and taxes that fall only on rents. Throughout the discussion I am assuming that, 
realistically, corporate tax reforms are unlikely to be undertaken in an internationally coordinated 
manner. Thus I consider reforms that are carried out by one country in isolation. 
 
2.2. Alternatives to a source-based corporation tax 
2.2.1. Taxing the full return to equity: a residence-based shareholder tax? 
 One radical option for reform, once advocated by McLure (1979) and Feldstein 
(1987), might be to abolish the source-based corporate income tax altogether and to impute all of 
the income of a company to its shareholders, subjecting that income to the residence-based personal 
income tax (option 3 in Table 1). The main rationale for such a reform is that only individuals can 
bear a tax burden and that the impersonal corporate income tax is ill suited to achieve distributional 
goals. A further argument is that such full imputation of corporate income to shareholders would 
ensure a fully identical tax treatment of corporate and noncorporate firms and a neutral tax 
treatment of the different sources of investment finance (debt, retained earnings and new equity). 
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Third, since a residence-based tax can be avoided only by moving abroad, and since individuals are 
much less mobile across borders than capital, a switch to worldwide income taxation at the personal 
shareholder level would greatly reduce the capital flight problem, provided that tax on foreign 
source income can be enforced. Finally, abolishing the whole edifice of the corporation tax might 
lead to considerable reductions in the costs of tax administration and compliance. 
 Nevertheless, there are a number of arguments against such a radical reform. For 
example, subjecting retained corporate profits to personal tax at the shareholder level on an accruals 
basis would create a liquidity problem for shareholders who receive little or no dividend from the 
company. Moreover, it is hardly realistic to expect that foreign corporations or foreign tax 
authorities would be willing to provide the information necessary to impute the retained profits of 
foreign companies to domestic holders of foreign shares. In the absence of an accruals-based  tax on 
capital gains on (foreign) shares, the domestic shareholder could then defer his tax on retained 
profits in foreign companies until the time of realization of the shares. This would favour the 
holding of foreign shares relative to investment in domestic shares. To eliminate tax discrimination 
between domestic and foreign shares, it would be necessary to give up imputing retained profits in 
domestic companies to their domestic shareholders and to rely instead on a personal tax on realized 
capital gains on shares. However, in the absence of tax at the corporate level, this would leave a 
loophole in the tax system, allowing deferral of personal tax through the shifting of income into the 
corporate sector. The deferral advantage would also violate domestic investment neutrality and 
cause a ’lock-in’ of capital in existing corporations by reducing the cost of capital for corporate 
investment financed by retained earnings. 
 Because of these problems, abolishing the corporation tax and imputing corporate 
income to shareholders is hardly a realistic reform option. 
2.2.2  Taxing the full return to equity: a residence-based corporation tax? 
 As indicated above, an important function of the corporation tax is to ensure that at 
least some tax is levied on retained corporate profits. However, imposing tax on domestic-source 
corporate profits accruing to foreign investors is not necessary if the main function of the 
corporation tax is to serve as a backstop to the domestic personal income tax. Thus one could 
imagine that the corporation tax were based on a consistent residence principle where all 
corporations headquartered in the domestic country are taxed on their worldwide income, but where 
no tax is levied on domestic-source corporate profits accruing to foreign owners of corporate capital 
operating in the domestic economy (option 2 in Table 1). In practice the elimination of source 
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taxation could be implemented by granting a credit to foreign shareholders for (their proportionate 
share of) any corporation tax paid by foreign-owned companies operating in the domestic country. 
By abolishing source taxation in this way, the incentive for inward investment by foreign investors 
would greatly increase. Of course, this comes at the price of giving up the revenue from the taxation 
of inward foreign direct investment. 
 To avoid international double taxation, the residence-based corporation tax could be 
combined with a credit for taxes paid abroad. In principle, this would ensure capital export 
neutrality (if the credit were given without limitation) and would eliminate the incentive for resident 
multinationals to invest in foreign low-tax countries rather than at home. Even if the foreign tax 
credit were limited to the amount of domestic tax payable on the foreign income (in line with 
current practice), the residence-based corporation tax would still eliminate the incentive for 
domestic multinationals to locate their subsidiaries in foreign tax havens. 
However, company headquarters may be quite mobile internationally, so a residence-
based corporation tax may not enable a country to maintain an (average) effective tax rate 
significantly above that prevailing in other countries, since companies can escape a high tax rate by 
moving their residence to a low-tax country. Moreover, it would be very hard to implement a 
consistent residence-based corporation tax (see Sørensen (1993)). The main problem would be the 
auditing of and enforcement of domestic tax on profits of foreign affiliates that are retained abroad. 
Like a residence-based shareholder tax, a residence-based corporation tax thus does not seem a 
viable reform option. 
 
2.2.3 Taxing rents: a destination-based cash flow business tax? 
 A main argument for maintaining the corporation tax is that it serves partly as a non-
distortionary tax on pure rents. If such rent capture is seen as the main function of the corporation 
tax, there is a case for designing it so as to leave the normal return to capital free of tax. This case is 
strengthened in a small open economy where capital mobility implies that a tax on the normal return 
to capital tends to be shifted onto the less mobile factors of production, as we explained earlier. 
 A cash flow tax on the real and/or financial surplus of firms allows an immediate 
expensing of investment. Because the present value of the cash flows from a marginal investment is 
just equal to the initial investment outlay, the cash flow tax therefore leaves marginal investment 
projects free of tax, falling only on pure rents. In a closed economy this feature would ensure that a 
cash flow tax would be nondistortionary. However, in an open economy the rents earned by 
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multinational companies often derive from firm-specific assets and may be generated in many 
alternative locations. When the fixed costs of doing business are so large that multinationals choose 
to serve several national markets from a single location rather than producing in all countries, a cash 
flow tax on internationally mobile rents will therefore affect the international location decisions of 
multinationals, even though it will not reduce the privately optimal scale of local investment once a 
company has decided to locate in a particular country. 
 A cash flow tax on the net total of the firm’s real and financial flows is essentially a 
dividend tax with a deduction for new share issues. In principle this tax base is more narrow than 
the conventional corporate tax base. In recent years most discussions of the cash flow tax have 
assumed that the tax would be levied on the so-called R-base which includes only cash flows from 
the firm’s ’real’ transactions, leaving out financial transactions, including interest payments. This is 
also the assumption made here (although it may be worth considering whether the tax base for firms 
in the financial service industry should include financial cash flows). 
As indicated by options 7 and 8 in Table 1, there are alternative ways of designing a cash 
flow corporation tax in an open economy.19 One unconventional option is a VAT-type destination-
based cash flow tax. The tax base under this scheme is sales to domestic customers minus purchases 
from domestic suppliers and minus labour costs. Thus, export sales are not taxable, whereas all 
imports are taxed. Essentially the tax base is therefore equal to the current VAT base minus labour 
costs (assuming that the tax is levied on all firms, and not just on corporations). Because of the 
formal similarity with the VAT, it is possible that such a tax could get the status of an indirect tax 
consistent with current international tax law so that domestic tax could also be levied on the 
domestic sales of foreign-based firms. In that case the tax would not only fall on firms located in the 
domestic economy; it would also fall on firms servicing the domestic market from abroad. This is 
one of the attractions of the destination base: because the tax on sales to the domestic market cannot 
be avoided by moving production abroad, the system minimizes the incentive to relocate. 
Because it allows deduction for wage costs, the VAT-type cash flow tax is basically a tax on 
domestic consumption out of non-wage income. Pure rents are taxed only to the extent that they are 
consumed by residents in the domestic jurisdiction. Hence the VAT-type cash flow tax will not 
                                                 
19 A by now classical treatment of cash flow taxation was given by the Meade Committee (1978). Destination-based 
cash flow taxes were considered by Bradford (2000) and Grubert and Newlon (1997). Bond and Devereux (2002), 
Bradford (2004) and Zee (2006) analyse alternative cash flow taxes in an open economy.  
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distort the investment and location decisions of firms, but at the same time it will not enable the 
domestic government to capture any of the rents accruing to foreigners.  
A very attractive feature of the VAT-type destination-based cash flow tax is that it 
eliminates the transfer-pricing problem: since the proceeds of a sale to a foreign customer are not 
included in the tax base, the price that related companies within a multinational group use to 
account for an export transaction has no impact on the amount of tax paid. The same holds for an 
import from a related foreign party: the price set by the parties does not matter for tax purposes 
because there is no deduction. 
On the other hand a destination-based cash flow tax raises a special transition problem: since 
exports are tax exempt whereas imports are taxed, the domestic-currency prices of exports have to 
fall (or the domestic price level has to increase) by the amount of the tax to restore equilibrium in 
domestic and foreign product markets. Because of short-run nominal wage and price rigidities, this 
adjustment process could cause considerable friction unless the exchange rate is flexible. But even 
if the adjustment were handled smoothly through an appreciation of the domestic currency, there 
would be windfall gains and losses as domestic residents with net claims on foreigners 
(denominated in foreign currency) would experience an erosion of the real value of these claims, 
whereas domestic residents with net liabilities vis á vis foreign countries would benefit from a fall 
in the real value of their debts. If investors dealing with foreigners anticipate the switch to the 
destination-based cash flow tax, they will try to rearrange their portfolios so as to reap a gain and/or 
to avoid a loss. The resulting capital flows could cause disruptions in capital markets and foreign 
exchange markets around the time of reform. Any future anticipated tax rate changes after the 
introduction of the tax would tend to cause similar disruptions. 
Because of these problems with a destination-based tax, it seems worthwhile to consider the 
alternative of a source-based cash flow tax. 
 
2.3. Alternative source-based business tax systems 
2.3.1. Taxing rents: a source-based cash flow business tax? 
As already mentioned, there is an efficiency case for taxing domestic location-specific 
rents accruing to foreigners. This may be achieved through a source-based cash flow tax where tax 
is levied on the net cash flow from domestic production, i.e., the cash flow from domestic and 
foreign sales minus the cash expenses on the purchase of domestic and imported inputs, including 
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the purchase of capital goods, and minus labour costs. Such a tax will cut into all pure rents earned 
from domestic production. 
As long as the tax does not induce companies earning mobile rents to relocate their 
production, the source-based cash flow tax is a nondistortionary means of shifting rents from 
foreigners to domestic residents (via the public budget). However, if the tax becomes too high, it 
will cause a shift of production out of the domestic economy. The stronger the local agglomeration 
forces and the better the local infrastructure, the greater is the element of location-specific rent in 
the total rent earned by companies, and the higher is the cash flow tax rate which may be sustained 
without deterring investors. Like the existing corporation tax, a source-based cash flow tax will give 
a tax incentive for multinationals to manipulate the transfer prices used in intra-company 
transactions. Indeed, compared to a traditional tax, at the same revenue, the statutory cash flow tax 
rate would be higher, giving greater incentive to shift profits away. 
To counter the transfer-pricing problem, Bradford (2003) proposed that all cross-border real 
and financial cash flow transactions between related parties in a multinational group should be 
included in the tax base. The idea is that if, say, a parent company charges an artificially low royalty 
payment to its foreign subsidiary, the parent will subsequently receive a higher dividend from the 
subsidiary than if it had claimed an arm’s length royalty. But if the dividend from the foreign 
affiliate is included in the tax base of the parent, any saving in the parent’s tax due to understating 
the royalty is offset by an equal increase in tax as a result of the consequently higher dividend. In 
principle, the fact that the parent’s tax payment is deferred is no problem under a cash flow tax 
which does not tax the normal return to capital, since the timing of tax payments does not matter 
under such a system. By contrast, under a conventional income tax deferral does generate a gain to 
the taxpayer.20  
Introducing a cash flow tax – be it destination-based or source-based - could cause 
significant transition problems.21 For example, initially the tax will fall mostly on the cash flows 
from ’old’ investment and will have the character of an (unanticipated) capital levy. This could 
                                                 
20 To see this, suppose a taxpayer earns a capital income of 1 euro which is immediately taxed at the capital 
income tax rate t, leaving him with an after-tax income of 1-t. If he saves this income, his wealth after one  
year will be X=(1-t)(1+r(1-t)), where r is the pre-tax interest rate.  On the other hand, if the taxpayer can 
defer the tax on the initial income by one year, he can invest the full pre-tax income of 1 euro in the capital  
market during the year. He will then earn a  net interest of r(1-t) and end up with an amount of wealth equal  
to Z= r(1-t)+1-t after payment of tax. His gain from the deferral of tax will therefore be Z - X = t r(1-t).   
This gain is positive under an income tax where t > 0, but it is zero under a cash flow tax that effectively  
leaves the normal return to capital free of tax. 
21 The problems involved in the transition to cash flow taxation are carefully discussed by Zodrow (2002, 2003) and 
Bradford (2004). 
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create liquidity problems for capital-intensive and heavily indebted companies, necessitating 
extensive grandfathering rules such as a continuation of depreciation allowances for ’old’ capital 
and continuation of deductions for interest on ’old’ debt. The more extensive the grandfathering, the 
smaller will be the efficiency gain from the cash flow tax. 
Unanticipated tax rate changes occurring after the introduction of the cash flow tax will also 
generate windfall losses or gains. Moreover, a fully anticipated tax rate change could seriously 
disrupt the timing of investment. For example, if firms expect a future increase in the cash flow tax 
rate, they will postpone their investment to be able to deduct the investment expenditure against the 
higher future tax rate. Conversely, if they expect a future fall in the tax rate, firms will bring 
forward investment to take advantage of the expensing of investment against the higher current tax 
rate. Thus a cash flow tax with a time-varying tax rate may generate significant investment 
distortions and macroeconomic instability, as emphasized by Bradford (2004). 
 Another problem is that countries operating a foreign tax credit system may not be willing 
to recognize a cash flow tax as a tax eligible for foreign tax credit. 
Despite the many theoretical virtues of cash flow taxation, introducing and operating a cash 
flow tax may thus meet with considerable practical difficulties.22 
 
2.3.2.  Taxing rents: an Allowance for Corporate Equity? 
 As an alternative to a cash flow tax, the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) 
proposed by the Capital Taxes Group of the Institute for Fiscal Studies (1991) and by Devereux and 
Freeman (1991) may be a more realistic way of implementing a tax on pure rents, causing fewer 
transitional problems and ensuring greater conformity with current international tax law. Under the 
ACE system (option 6 in Table 1) companies are allowed to deduct an imputed normal return on 
their equity from the corporate income tax base, parallel to the deduction for interest on debt. In this 
way the ACE seeks to ensure neutrality between finance by debt and finance by equity. The ACE 
system may be combined with personal taxes on interest, dividends and capital gains, ensuring 
taxation of the normal return at the shareholder level. 
 One attractive feature of the ACE  - originally pointed out by Boadway and Bruce 
(1984) - is that it offsets the investment distortions caused by deviations between true economic 
                                                 
22 Nevertheless, the Estonian experience with a tax on distributed corporate profits suggests that a cash flow business 
tax may indeed be viable in practice. If the Estonian distribution tax were modified to allow a deduction for the revenue 
from new share issues, it would be equivalent to a so-called S-based cash flow tax in the terminology of the Meade 
Committee (1978). The Estonian business tax experiment is reviewed in Devereux and Sørensen (2005, pp. 44-46). 
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depreciation and depreciation for tax purposes. For example, if firms write down their assets at an 
accelerated pace, the current tax saving from accelerated depreciation will be offset by a fall in 
future rate-of-return allowances of equal present value, since accelerated depreciation reduces the 
book value of the assets to which future rates of return are imputed. In fact, regardless of the rate at 
which firms write down their assets in the tax accounts, the present value of the sum of the capital 
allowance and the ACE allowance will always equal the initial investment outlay, so the ACE 
system is equivalent to the immediate expensing of investment allowed under a cash flow tax. 
Another attraction of the ACE is that the symmetric treatment of debt and equity 
eliminates the need for thin capitalization rules to protect the domestic tax base: since firms get a 
deduction for an imputed interest on their equity as well as for the interest on their debt, 
multinationals have no incentive to undercapitalize a subsidiary operating in a country with an ACE 
system. 
The neutrality properties of the ACE system will depend on whether the imputed rate of 
return on equity is set at the ’right’ level. In principle it is not necessary to include a risk premium 
in the imputed rate of return, provided the tax reduction stemming from the ACE allowance is a 
’safe’ cash flow from the viewpoint of the firm (see Bond and Devereux (1995)). This requires full 
loss offsets, including unlimited carry-forward of losses with interest. With limitations on loss 
offsets, the imputed return should include a risk premium, but in practice the tax authorities would 
not have the firm-specific information necessary to choose the ’correct’ risk premium. Hence some 
distortion of the pattern of investment and risk taking would be unavoidable under incomplete loss 
offsets.23 
Like a cash flow tax, the ACE system is a tax on pure rents. Such a tax inevitably 
imposes a higher average tax rate on highly profitable firms than on less profitable firms (indeed, 
firms earning only normal returns go free of tax). In the context of an open economy where firms 
earn mobile rents, this may be a problematic feature of the ACE system if policy makers raise the 
corporate tax rate to offset the revenue loss caused by the introduction of the ACE allowance. In 
that case the transition to the ACE system will raise the relative and absolute tax burden on the most 
profitable firms, possibly inducing them to relocate abroad, and leaving the domestic economy with 
the less profitable (and hence presumably the less dynamic) firms, as pointed out by Bond (2000). 
                                                 
23 In particular, many small businesses may be credit-constrained and may therefore have a higher cost of equity finance 
than large companies with easier access to capital markets, but in practice the deductible imputed cost of equity finance 
would probably have to be the same for all firms. 
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Moreover, in so far as transition to an ACE requires a rise in the statutory tax rate, it will 
increase the country’s vulnerability to outward profit-shifting via transfer-pricing. 
However, these are general points about all taxes on rents, and are not a particular 
weakness of the ACE system. Indeed, the ACE shares several strengths and weaknesses with other 
rent taxes such as the various cash flow taxes. On the positive side, both the ACE and the cash flow 
taxes eliminate distortions due to deviations between true economic depreciation and depreciation 
for tax purposes, and both types of taxes are in principle neutral towards corporate financing 
decisions. On the negative side, by exempting normal returns from tax, rent taxes tend to require 
higher statutory tax rates to secure the desired revenue. This is likely to deter inward investment by 
highly profitable multinationals and to provoke outward profit-shifting through transfer-pricing.  
One important difference between the ACE and cash flow taxation is that anticipated 
tax rate changes may cause serious distortions to the timing of investment under the latter tax 
system, as we explained in the previous section. Introducing cash flow taxation is also likely to 
cause more significant transition problems. On the other hand, we noted that in practice it may be 
difficult to set the imputed cost of equity finance at the ‘right’ level under the ACE.24 
 
2.3.3. Taxing the full return to capital: the Comprehensive Business Income Tax 
 The ACE aims at tax neutrality between equity and debt by allowing a deduction for 
the (opportunity) cost of equity as well as debt. The so-called Comprehensive Business Income Tax 
(CBIT) proposed by the U.S. Treasury in 1992 also seeks to end the tax discrimination in favour of 
debt finance, but it does so by eliminating the deductibility of interest payments.25 The aim of the 
CBIT proposal was to secure a single uniform tax on all corporate source income at a rate (roughly) 
equal to the top marginal personal tax rate on capital income. In this way the CBIT would in 
principle make personal taxes on corporate source income redundant, given the Treasury’s goal of 
ending the classical double taxation of such income. 
Given the practical problems of enforcing residence-based personal taxes on interest 
income and the prevalence of tax-exempt institutional investors investing in debt instruments, it 
seems realistic to assume that a large part of total interest income currently goes untaxed in most 
countries. By essentially introducing an interest income tax at source, the CBIT might therefore 
                                                 
24 Interestingly, Croatia has tested an ACE in practice. The Croatian experience is reviewed in Rose and Wiswesser 
(1998) and Keen and King (2002). 
25 The Comprehensive Business Income Tax is described and discussed in the report of the U.S. Treasury (1992). Bond 
(2000) discusses the pros and cons of  the ACE versus the CBIT. 
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imply a significant increase in the cost of debt finance. Clearly this could act as a strong deterrent to 
debt-financed inward investment. On the other hand the broadness of the CBIT tax base would 
allow a relatively low corporate tax rate, for any given amount of revenue collected. The low 
statutory tax rate would imply a relatively low average effective tax rate on highly profitable 
companies. If the same amount of business tax revenue had to be collected under an ACE system, a 
higher statutory tax rate would be needed, so despite the non-deductibility of interest under the 
CBIT, this tax system might well be more attractive for high-yielding companies than the ACE. 
Since highly profitable companies are often high-tech multinationals generating significant positive 
externalities in the host country of investment, a small open economy may prefer the CBIT to the 
ACE because the former system may generate more inward investment with positive spillovers on 
the domestic economy. 
On the other hand, the CBIT and the ACE may be seen as alternative methods of 
eliminating the classical double taxation of corporate equity income, so if the revenue from the 
CBIT is required to compensate for the loss of revenue from personal taxes on dividends and capital 
gains on shares, there is less scope for lowering the statutory corporate tax rate under this tax 
system. Still, since part of the shares in domestic companies are held by foreigners and by tax-
exempt institutional investors, alleviating  double taxation at the corporate level – as is done under 
the ACE – will almost surely involve a greater revenue loss than double tax relief at the domestic 
personal shareholder level. 
 The effects of a revenue-neutral transition from a classical corporate tax system to the 
CBIT may thus be summarized as follows: for low-yielding companies relying mostly on debt, the 
cost of capital could rise significantly, but for high-yielding companies relying mainly on equity the 
overall cost of capital would most likely fall. 
However, the assumption of revenue-neutrality may be unrealistic: to prevent too 
many bankruptcies as a result of the transition to a CBIT with no deduction for interest payments, it 
would probably be necessary to apply a rather low corporate tax rate under this tax system. Since 
the CBIT proposal also abolishes personal taxes on shareholder income, the reform might lead to a 
non-negligible revenue loss, given the need for a low corporate tax rate. 
   
2.3.4. Taxing the full return to capital: the dual income tax 
 As noted in section 1.4, the theoretical case for a zero tax rate on the normal return to 
capital is not clear-cut, and despite the policy inconsistencies alluded to in section 1.6, most 
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governments apparently prefer to maintain some amount of tax on normal returns, including returns 
accruing to foreigners. However, the international mobility of capital and the opportunities for 
international profit-shifting impose a tight constraint on the level of source-based corporate taxes 
that can be sustained in a small open economy in the absence of international tax coordination. 
Hence it will be optimal to keep the source-based corporate tax rate fairly low in a small open 
economy, especially in a ’peripheral’ country where business does not benefit from significant 
agglomeration forces. For revenue and distributional reasons it will therefore typically be necessary 
to have a top marginal tax rate on labour income which is significantly higher than the corporate tax 
rate. 
Some years ago the Nordic countries decided to make a virtue out of this necessity by 
introducing the so-called Dual Income Tax (option 4 in Table 1). 26 The Dual Income Tax (DIT) 
imposes a low flat uniform tax rate on all income from capital (including corporate income) and 
applies a progressive tax schedule to labour income. In the pure version of the system, the tax rate 
in the lowest bracket of the schedule for labour income is aligned with the capital income tax rate so 
that only labour income above a certain level is taxed at a higher rate. Thus the DIT may also be 
described as a combination of a proportional tax on all income and a progressive surtax on high 
labour income. The flatness and uniformity of the capital income tax may be seen as an attempt to 
achieve the greatest possible degree of neutrality in a tax system that attempts to tax the full return 
to capital. 
 An interesting version of the DIT was the tax system prevailing in Norway from 1992 
until the end of 2005. Under this system the double taxation of corporate source equity income was 
fully alleviated. For dividends this was done through an imputation system, and for capital gains it 
was achieved through the so-called RISK system which allowed the shareholder to write up the 
basis of his shares with (his proportionate amount of) the retained profit which had already been 
subjected to corporation tax. Thus the personal capital gains tax was imposed only on (realized) 
income that had not already been taxed at the corporate level. Because all capital income was taxed 
uniformly and business income was taxed only once, the Norwegian DIT was in principle neutral 
towards investment and financing decisions. 
                                                 
26 The rationale for the Nordic Dual Income Tax is explored in Sørensen (1994, 2005b) and Nielsen and Sørensen 
(1997). Sijbren Cnossen’s preferred version of the system is described in Cnossen (2000). Elements of dual income 
taxation have been introduced in several European countries; see the survey by Eggert and Genser (2004). Recently 
variants of a dual income tax for Germany have been proposed by Sinn (2003, ch. 6) and by the German 
Sachverständigenrat (see Spengel and Wiegard (2004), and Wiegard et al. (2006)). Keuschnigg and Dietz (2005) 
propose a ‘Swiss Dual Income Tax’ which essentially combines the ACE with the new Norwegian shareholder income 
tax described in the next subsection. 
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 However, since labour income is taxed more heavily than income from capital, a DIT 
gives the taxpayer an incentive to relabel his labour income as capital income. This option is mainly 
open to (controlling) owners of small firms who work in their own business. To prevent such 
income shifting, the previous Norwegian tax rules required that the income of the self-employed 
and of ’active’ owners of corporations be split into a capital income component and a labour income 
component. The capital income component was calculated as an imputed return on the value of the 
business assets in the firm’s tax accounts. The residual business profit was then taxed as labour 
inome (up to a certain ceiling beyond which the profit was again categorized as capital income).27 
Since the capital income tax is flat and uniform across all taxpayers, the DIT allows 
taxes on corporate source income to be collected as withholding taxes at the corporate level, as 
under the Comprehensive Business Income Tax. In practice, the Nordic countries reduce 
withholding taxes on interest and dividends paid to foreign residents in accordance with bilateral 
double tax treaties. 
To make the enforcement of tax on interest income more effective in an open economy 
context, Cnossen (2000) has proposed that the DIT be combined with a withholding tax on interest 
income paid out to foreign (personal and corporate) investors, levied at the same rate as that 
applying to all other domestic-source capital income. This would move the DIT closer to the 
source-based CBIT (which is why the two tax systems are placed in the same box in Table 1). 
While the Cnossen proposal would reduce the current tax advantage to debt finance (arising from 
ineffective enforcement of tax on interest income), it would for the same reason increase the cost of 
debt finance and could potentially lead to a capital flight if implemented unilaterally by a small 
open economy. The discouraging German experience with a withholding tax on interest in the early 
1990s suggests that it is very difficult for a single country to impose even a low withholding tax on 
interest at source. 
 
2.3.5. Reinventing the Dual Income Tax: the 2006 Norwegian tax reform 
 As noted above, a Dual Income Tax requires a system of mandatory income splitting 
for small firms. In Norway this system has worked reasonably well for the self-employed, but not 
for so-called active owners of small companies. Under the Norwegian tax rules prevailing until the 
end of 2005, a shareholder was deemed to be ’active’ and hence liable to income splitting if he 
                                                 
27 The problems of income splitting under the dual income tax are discussed in more detail in Hagen and Sørensen 
(1998) and Sørensen (2005b). 
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carried out some minimum amount of work in the company and controlled at least two thirds of the 
shares (alone or together with his closest relatives). However, by inviting ’passive’ owners into the 
company, many Norwegian owner-managers were able to avoid mandatory income splitting and to 
have all of their income taxed at the low capital income tax rate even when a substantial part of the 
income was in fact labour income. Indeed, the number of small companies subject to mandatory 
income splitting was steadily falling since the introduction of the DIT in 1992, so this part of the 
Norwegian tax system turned out to be its Achilles heel.   
 Because of these problems with the income splitting system, the Norwegian 
parliament recently passed a tax reform bill that took effect from 2006, following recommendations 
from an expert committee. The reform replaced the problematic income splitting system for ’active’ 
shareholders by a so-called shareholder income tax (in Norwegian: ‘aksjonærmodellen’). This is a 
personal residence-based tax levied on that part of the taxpayer’s realized income from shares 
(dividends plus realized capital gains) which exceeds an imputed after-tax rate of interest on the 
basis of his shares. As demonstrated in Sørensen (2005a), the shareholder income tax will in 
principle be neutral, since it exempts the normal (risk free) return from tax. Shareholder income in 
excess of the imputed normal return is supposed to be taxed as ordinary capital income. At the 
margin, the total corporate and personal tax burden on corporate equity income will be roughly 
equal to the top marginal tax rate on labour income. Hence corporate owner-managers will gain 
nothing by transforming labour income into dividends and capital gains, allowing the abolition of 
the mandatory income splitting system for active shareholders. 
To avoid discrimination against investment in foreign shares, the rate-of-return 
allowance (RRA) under the shareholder income tax will be granted to holders of foreign as well as 
Norwegian shares. Compared to the present situation where no double tax relief is offered to 
holders of foreign shares, the RRA will give Norwegian taxpayers an incentive to report their 
foreign shareholdings. 
The new Norwegian shareholder income tax is not just a new technical solution to the 
problem of splitting business income into labour income and capital income; it also reflects a 
change in the philosophy underlying the DIT. Under the previous Norwegian version of the DIT the 
full return to corporate capital was taxed as capital income. Under the new Norwegian shareholder 
income tax the low capital income tax rate will apply only to an imputed risk-free rate of interest on 
the value of the shareholding, whereas all realized shareholder income in excess of the risk-free 
return will be taxed at (roughly) the high marginal rate applying to labour income. In other words, 
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the equity premium will be taxed as earned income. If the realized income from shares falls short of 
the imputed risk-free rate of return (the RRA) in some year, the unutilized RRA may be deducted 
from the base of the shareholder income tax in subsequent years and may also be added to the basis 
of the share. In this way unutilized RRAs are effectively carried forward with interest so as to 
ensure neutrality of the shareholder income tax (see Sørensen (2005a) for a formal treatment). A 
highly interesting feature of the shareholder income tax is that, although capital gains on shares are 
taxed only when they are realized, the RRA will ensure that realization decisions are not distorted 
by the tax, as proved in Sørensen (2005a). Indeed, the shareholder income tax satisfies the 
properties of the retrospective capital gains tax proposed by Auerbach (1991) and the generalized 
cash flow tax described by Auerbach and Bradford (2001); i.e., tax designs that are known to be 
neutral towards realization decisions even though they do not involve taxation of unrealized gains.  
 It still remains to be seen whether the new Norwegian shareholder income tax will 
provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of income shifting under the DIT. However, it should 
be noted that this problem is not specific to the Dual Income Tax. In most OECD countries the 
existence of social security taxes implies that the marginal effective tax rate on labour income often 
exceeds the marginal tax rate on capital income by a considerable margin. In all such cases 
taxpayers will have an incentive to try to relabel labour income as capital income. 
 
 
PART 3. SUMMING UP AND COMPARING ALTERNATIVE BLUEPRINTS FOR 
CAPITAL INCOME TAX REFORM 
 
In Part 2 I have tried to provide a balanced overview of the pros and cons relating to a 
number of proposals for fundamental capital income tax reform that have been prominent in the 
international tax policy debate in recent decades. Table 2 below attempts to summarize how the   
various blueprints for reform address the concerns of policy makers, that is, the extent to which they 
eliminate or reduce the most important distortions caused by existing corporate tax systems. 
In principle, the ACE, the CBIT, the DIT, the residence-based shareholder tax and the 
different variants of the cash flow tax all eliminate the tax distortions to the choice between debt 
and equity and between new equity and retained earnings. The ACE and the cash flow tax do so by 
exempting the normal return to capital from tax, whether it takes the form of interest on debt or 
whether it accrues as a return to corporate equity. By contrast, the CBIT and the DIT (in the variant 
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Table 2. Distortions addressed by 
alternative proposals for capital income tax reform 
 
 
Distortion to 
 
 
Reform proposal addressing distortion 
 
Choice between debt and equity   
 
 
ACE, Cash flow tax, CBIT, DIT, 
Residence-based shareholder tax 
 
Choice between new equity 
and retained earnings 
 
 
ACE, Cash flow tax, CBIT, DIT, 
Residence-based shareholder tax 
 
Choice of organizational form 
 
 
ACE, Cash flow tax, CBIT, DIT*, 
Residence-based shareholder tax 
 
Domestic real investment 
 
 
ACE, Cash flow tax 
 
International location  
of real investment 
 
 
Residence-based shareholder tax, 
Residence-based corporate income tax*, 
VAT-type destination-based cash flow tax 
 
International location 
of tax base 
 
Residence-based shareholder tax, 
Residence-based corporate income tax*, 
VAT-type destination-based cash flow tax 
 
* This reform proposal only partially alleviates the distortion mentioned. 
ACE = Allowance for Corporate Equity; CBIT = Comprehensive Business Income Tax; DIT = Dual Income Tax. 
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proposed by Cnossen (2000)) achieve financial neutrality by taxing all returns to debt and equity at 
the corporate level and at the same uniform rate, and the residence-based shareholder tax eliminates 
the corporate tax distortion to financial choices by simply abolishing the corporation tax. 
Proponents of the CBIT and the cash flow tax have presented these tax systems as blueprints 
for a general business tax, to be applied to corporate and non-corporate firms alike. Furthermore, 
although the ACE was originally proposed as a model for corporate tax reform, there is no reason 
why it could not be extended to all types of firms. When applied across the board, the CBIT, the 
cash flow tax and the ACE thus ensure tax neutrality with regard to the choice of organizational 
form.28 The DIT also strives to achieve neutrality between the corporate and non-corporate sector 
by alleviating the double taxation of the (normal) return to corporate equity. However, since 
corporate and non-corporate firms are not subject to quite the same tax rules, the DIT probably does 
not achieve full tax neutrality across different types of firms, as indicated by the asterisk in Table 
2.29  
Once companies have made a decision on their international location, the ACE and the cash 
flow tax ensure that decisions regarding the scale of investment are left undistorted by taxation. The 
reason is that both types of tax imply a zero marginal effective tax rate, driving no wedge between 
the international cost of finance and the required pre-tax return on investment. Hence the statement 
in Table 2 that these tax systems eliminate the distortion to domestic real investment. By contrast, 
source-based taxes that include the normal return to capital in the tax base will cause the required 
pre-tax rate of return to deviate from the international cost of finance. Residence-based taxes will 
also be distortionary unless depreciation for tax purposes happens by chance to equal the true 
economic depreciation of the asset. For these reasons only the ACE and the cash flow tax are 
claimed to be neutral towards domestic investment in Table 2. 
In so far as a consistent residence-based shareholder tax can be administered (involving full 
imputation of domestic and foreign source corporate income to individual shareholders), it will be 
neutral towards the international location of corporate investment, as long as shareholders maintain 
their residence. Thus the international tax policy game would change from the current fierce 
competition to attract highly mobile corporate capital to a competition to attract the less mobile 
                                                 
28 The benefits from neutrality in this dimension may be non-negligible. For example, using data for the period 1959-
1986, Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1997) estimated that the deadweight loss from tax distortions to the choice of 
organizational form in the US amounted to 16 percent of total business tax revenue. 
29 Under the new Norwegian tax system that took effect from 2006, the owners of companies are subject to the new 
shareholder income tax, whereas proprietors will continue to be taxed under a streamlined version of the previous 
income splitting system. 
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individual shareholders. However, we also noted that implementing a residence-based system of full 
imputation and doing away with the corporation tax would most likely meet with insurmountable 
practical difficulties. A consistent residence-based corporate income tax with an unlimited foreign 
tax credit is arguably easier to implement, but it is vulnerable to the fact that corporate headquarters 
can be quite mobile. In practice this reform option is therefore unlikely to ensure full neutrality with 
regard to the international location of investment, as suggested by the asterisk in Table 2. In 
principle, a destination-based cash flow tax ensures neutrality towards location decisions, but as we 
explained in section 2.2.3, this tax regime involves special transition problems relating to residents 
with net foreign assets or liabilities. 
To the extent that it can be implemented, a consistent residence-based tax will solve the 
problem of international profit-shifting via transfer-pricing and thin capitalization, since companies 
and/or their owners will gain nothing from shifting corporate profit from domestic to foreign 
entities within a multinational group. But again, enforcing the residence principle is a daunting task. 
In comparison, a destination-based cash flow tax of the VAT type could surely be administered – 
after all, most OECD countries are already running a VAT system – but it does raise transition 
problems as well as the problem that anticipated tax rate changes might seriously distort the timing 
of investment.  
Because they treat debt and equity finance alike, the ACE, the cash flow tax, the CBIT and 
the source-based DIT proposed by Cnossen (2000) all eliminate the problem of international profit-
shifting though thin capitalization. However, the standard transfer-pricing problem remains with all 
of these systems, and it is likely to be exacerbated under the ACE and under the cash flow tax, 
because these tax regimes will tend to require a higher statutory tax rate, given that tax is levied 
only on rents. 
The basic message from this discussion is that governments are faced with trade-offs in 
multiple dimensions. For example, according to Table 2 the move to a destination-based cash flow 
tax of the VAT type – that is, a tax on domestic consumption out of non-wage income - would in 
principle eliminate all the important distortions on which policy-makers have tended to focus. 
However, this is achieved only through a radical departure from current tax practices, i.e., by giving 
up the taxation of normal returns to capital30 and the taxation of domestic-source income accruing 
to foreigners. 
                                                 
30 In principle, of course, it would still be possible to combine a business tax on pure profits with a personal income tax 
on interest, dividends and capital gains to ensure some amount of tax on normal returns. 
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As another example, while rent taxes like the ACE and the cash flow tax achieve neutrality 
in many important dimensions, they also tend to increase the transfer-pricing problem by making it 
harder to keep the statutory tax rate low. And while the CBIT and the source-based DIT do in 
principle allow a low statutory rate because these taxes are levied on a broad base, in practice a 
source-based tax on the normal return (especially a source tax on interest) is likely to exacerbate the 
problem of capital flight. 
From a practical administrative viewpoint, the ACE and the DIT seem easier to implement 
than the other reform options considered here. Indeed, both of these tax systems have already been 
tested in practice. The fundamental policy decision to make when choosing between these two 
alternatives is whether a business tax should tax the normal return to capital or not. 
In an uncertain world, it is some comfort to be able to make one safe prediction: the 
controversy over capital income taxation will continue! 
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